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This paper investigates the perception of the international community
following the eruption of the debt crisis in 1982. The results of time-wise
autoregressive model indicate that bankers' creditworthiness assessments
are sensitive to risk factors not only from liquidity and solvency but also
from long-term structural risk factors. It also provides evidence of regional
contamination, the continued influence of borrowers' rescheduling experi-
ence and bankers' desire for market opportunities. On file other hand, the
one-way fixed effects panel data analysis provide evidence that bankers'
creditworthiness assessments are greatly influenced by "non-quantifiable"
country-specific risks presumed to arise from its socio-political conditions
proxied by country dummies. These risks appear topredominate those
arising from both the country's liquidity and solvency conditions as well as
rescheduling experience and regional contamination. The latter results also
indicate that the only economic variable that can possibly alter bankers'
fixed perceptions are those that reflect the country's resource allocation,
savings or investment behavior and level of debt burden.
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I
INTRODUCTION
What appears to be a more pressing issue, after more than a decade since
the eruption of the debt crisis, is no longer whether acountry,will reschedule
or even default on its debt-servicing but rather when will voluntary lending
resume. The resumption of voluntary lending may be largely dependent on
the successful adjustment of rescheduling countries. But it is also equally
important that the financial markets perceive these countries' plans and debt
policies as sustainable. It is very likely that the market perceptions of a
country's reschedtiling probabilities may be self-fulfilling. If banks con-
tinue to limit a country's access to external finance because they perceive
that country to have high rescheduling probability, that country will often
have difficulty servicing its external debt. On the other hand, if bankers
perceived a country to be creditworthy and decide to support its borrowing
needs, that country is more likely to avoid further rescheduling and may
well be able to finance.its thrust towards sustainable growth and recovery.
The empirical work in this area has been hampered by the fact that
bankers' perceptions are largely unobservable. Moreover, it is believed that
subjective information vary from one bank to the other or from transaction
to transaction because of previous experiences and the relationships that
have been formed in the lending process. Most empirical studies attempt to
tackle this issue by determining the sensitivity of interest rate premia to
"objective" risk factors, reflecting the debtor's economic situation (see
Edwards 1984, Feder et al. 1980, 1981, Goodman 1980). jAlthough results
showed the significance of a number of economic performance and tradi-
tional ereditworthiness indicators, they could not adequately aeeount for the
Variation in the prices of international loans. They did provide some evi-
1. Edwards usedthe spreadbetweentheinterestchargedto a particularcountryandthe
LondonInterbankBorrowingRate(LIBOR).He arguedthatif thefinancialcommunity
distinguishes between countries withdifferent probabilities ofdefault,theseperceptions will
bereflectedinthespreadsovertheLIBOR,withriskiercountries (i.e.,countrieswithhigher
probabilityofrescheduling willbechargedwithahigherriskpremium).MCMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTION OF COUNTRYCREDI'rVVORTHINESS 187
dence however, that lenders underestimated the degree of risk involved in
cross border lending prior to the 1982 crisis.
In this paper, thedifficulty inobserving lenders' perception will be dealt
with by utilizing the Institutional Investor Country Risk Rating (IICR),
which is generated from an actual surveyofbankers' perception of country
creditworthiness by the Institutional Investor of New York, an international
finance magazine. The bi-annual survey (March and September) started in
the late 1970s and covers 75 to 100 most active banks involved in interna-
tional lending. Bankers are asked to assign a score, on a scale of zero to 100,
to different countries according to their perception of the country's chances
of running into debt-servicing difficulties. A rating of zero represents the
least creditworthy, having the highest probability of rescheduling, while a
grade of 100 represents the most creditworthy, having the least chance of
debt-servicing difficulties. The individual responsesare averaged using a
weighting procedure which gives more importance to banks with the largest
worldwide exposure and the most sophisticated country risk analysis sys-
tems. This paper stars with the conviction that these scores are areasonable
measure of the market's perceived rescheduling probabilities of debtor
countries.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the perceptions of the interna-
tional banking community following the eruption of the debt crisis in 1982.
The paper will investigate the extent to which bankers' perceptions are
influenced by risk factors arising from the country's economic conditions
and those factors emanating from the bankers' own Subjective experiences
regarding these countries or group of countries. The study will also attempt
to determ inethe significance and isolate the effects ofperceived "non-quan-
tifiable" country-specific risk factors in the formation of these assessments.
These latter factors may be taken to reflect the political, legal, and social
risks involved, otherwise not captured by the economic risk indicators. In
particular the paper will attempt to address the following questions:
1. Do banks perceive a country's inability to service its external debt
as now being related to medium-term adjustment problems and
deeper structural constraints or do they continue to believe that a188 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
debt crisis can be brought about by mere short-term liquidity
problems?
2. Does the "reputation" of being a reseheduler influence bankers'
assessment? Do banks perceive it as a signal for further
debt-servicing problems or as a signal that things are being put in
order? Hence, in what way and to what extent does a debtor's
rescheduling experience influence bankers' perception of a
country's creditworthiness?
3. In the same'context, do regional developments have any effect on
bankers' perceptions? Can differences in perception also be
attributed to geographical contamination risks? In other words,
were there regional contagion effects? And have they persisted
through these years?
4. To what extent is the post-1982 perception still influenced by
bankers' desire for market opportunities?
5. Finally, the study recognizes that there are other important risk
factors which cannot be included explicitly as independent
variables but maybe deduced from inclusion of dummies designed
to capture country-specific effects. These risks are presumed to
have systematically affected bankers' lending experience and thus
cannot be assumed as random disturbances. These risks may arise
not only from the political but also from the legal, social and
environmental constraints characterizing the debtor country. Thus,
to what extent are bankers' perceptions influenced by these risks?
The structure of the paper will be as follows: Section II presents country
ereditworthiness ratings generated from IICR data from 1979-1992. In
Section Ill, the empirical model is presented. Section IV discusses the data
and the methodology. The results are presented in Section V. And finally,
conclusions are given in Section VI.McMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTION OF COUNTRYCREDI'I"VVORTHINESS 189
II
COUNTRY CREDITWORTHINESS RATINGS, 1979-1992
Figure 1 shows the average creditworthiness rating of the 74 sample
countries from 1979 to 1990, as well as the global rating representing the
109 countries covered by the Institutional Investor survey (see Appendix l
for listing of sample countries). Each country is taken as one unit in arriving
at the average rating. The global rating includes countries from North
America, Japan and all major creditors. Thus the average is higher than
those of the countries considered in this paper having mostly developing
economies. It seems clear that throughout the 1980s the perceived credit-
worthiness has lnoved in exactly the same direction. The figure shows that
the sharp decline in the bankers' perception of country creditworthines
started prior to the eruption of the debt crisis in 1982. If the decline in the
creditworthiness rating signals the market perception of increasing re-
scheduling or maybe even outright default probabilities, this may imply that
the 1982 debt crisis did not take the market by surprise. It either confirms
their views or shows that their perception may have precipitated the massive
global debt reschedulings.
This may provide evidence to contentions that perceptions did not quite
guide bank lending behavior during the years prior to 1982 debt crisis.
Despite the perceived increasing risk in international lending, banks con-
tinued to roll over debts. Two reasons may account for this behavior. First,
the need to recycle funds created a demand for loan markets which conse-
quently led to increased funding for countries exhibiting greater market
potential. Second, lmving already exposed thelnselves, the refusal to roll
over debts could jeopardize previous lendings. It was not until Mexico
announced a moratorium in August 1982 that bankers started confronting
the reality that indeed countries might default.
The creditworthiness perception reached a bottom in 1984 and although
there was slight improvement in the period following 1984, it seemed
improbable that it would reach its pre-crisis levels for some time to come.
The decline continued once more after 1986, settling atjust a little over 39,190 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
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way below the rating of over 55 when the survey began. The further collapse
in the ereditworthiness rating in 1991 and 1992 reflected the possibility that
voluntary lending might still bea long way off for most developing countries
which had encountered debt-servicing difficulties despite the structural
adjustment programs they were undertaking.
It can be seen in Figure 2 that all regions experienced a decline in
creditworthiness rating, but countries from both the African-South of_Sa-
hara and Latin American-Caribbean regions were perceived as the least
ereditworthy. Throughout the 14-year period, their ratings were way below
the global rating and the average rating for the sample countries. BothMoMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTION OF COUNTRYCREDITWORTHINESS 191
Figure2
REGIONAL CREDITWORTHINESS, 1979-1992
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regions suffered continued declines throughout the 1980s. While the Afri-
can-South of Sahara region rating continued to slide furthers/the creditwor-
•thiness rating of the Latin America,_-Caribbean region appeared to show
slight improvement in the 1990s.
The Asia-Pacific region also experienced declines following the debt
crisis. It was, however, perceived as the most creditworthy region with a
rating of over 50 throughout the 14-year period. Its ratings were far above
the global rating and the average rating for the sample countries.
The Europe-Mediterranean region, although registering ratings above
the average creditworthiness for the sample countries, did experience192 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
declines in the early 1980s. From 1979 to 1985, its ratings were below the
global average and that for the Middle East region. However, after 1986 the
Europe-Mediterranean region slowly recovered to a position where it was
perceived as the most creditworthy, next only to the Asia-Pacific region.
From 1985 until the early 1990s, its ratings were higher than the average
for global creditworthiness.
Throughout the 14-year period, the average ratings of North Africa-
Middle East countries included in the study were way below file global
ratings, although flley were above the average creditworthiness rating -for
the sample countries. The region's rating reached a bottom in 1987, and,
although it showed some signs of improvement after that, its rating in the
early 1990s appeared not to indicate such a trend.
A country's rescheduling history may indicate the "reputation" the
country has gained in the international financial markets. Figure 3 shows
the movement in the creditworthiness rating of both rescheduling and
nonrescbeduling countries, Clearly, the rescheduling countries have lower
creditworthiness ratings and have experienced a steep decline from their
pre-crisis levels despite the rescue packages from multilateral lending
institutions that accompanied such rescheduling agreements. This may
provide evidence that, regardless of the nature ofrescheduling and even if
the structural adjustments that accompanied these reschedulings may con-
sequently lead to better growth prospects, the mere event may lead to the
markets' loss of confidence on the country's debt-servicing capacity.
Reschedulers continued to be perceived as high risk countries that have
higher probabilities of falling into debt-servicing difficulties and further
reschedulings. The n0nreschedulers rating also registered significant de-
clines, particularly during flae period leading to the debt crisis. But in
contrast to the reschedulers, flleir rating exhibited some signs of recovery
or at least a semblance of stability.
The figure also appears to indicate that after the 1984 to 1988 crisis-pe-
riod the nonreschedulers rating did not exhibit any further decline, while
for the reschedulers, the debt adjustment packages did not stop the continu-
ing decline, alflaough the rate of decline decreased significantly.McMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTION OF COUNTRY CREDITWORTHINESS 193
Figure 3
CREDITWORTHINESS RATINGS
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III
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
It is presumed that a group of risks arising fi'om the economic, political,
legal and social conditions in a country influences bankers' perception of
creditworthiness. The selection of risk factors is based primarily on previous194 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
empirical work concerning country risk analysis. The empirical model is
specified as follows:
IICR = f (TDGNP, RESTDSMP, AVGMTY, EXPGDP, INF,
•_ + -- + --
INVGDP, AGRGDP, GNPPC,GDP, RSKX, LA, EUR,
+ -- + + - _ _
AFR, ASIA, ME) (1)
, _ + +
where
IICR = bankers' perception ofcreditworthiness;
TDGNP -- country's solvency;
RESTDSMP = country's liquidity;
AVGMTY = loan duration;
EXPGDP = openness index;
INF = price stability;
INVGDP = investment behavior;
AGRGDP = resource allocation;
GNPPC = per capita income;
GDP = market potential;
RSKX = rescheduling experience;
LA = regionaldummy for Latin American-Carribean;
EUR = regional dummy for Europe-Mediterranean;
AFR = regional dummy for Africa-South of Sahara;
ASIA = regional dummy for Asia-Pacific; and
ME = regional dummy for the Middle East.
The signs expected are given below the equation.
Various authors have demonstrated the empirical significance of a
country's solvency as an indicator of its debt-servicing capacity. The
debt-to-exports ratio has been used by Sargen (1977), Cline (1984) andMcMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTION OF COUNTRYCREDITWORTHINESS 195
Taffier and Abassi (1984). Following Edwards (1984) and Kharas and
Levinshon (1988), the ratio of total debt to national income (TDGNP) will
be used as a measure of a country's solvency in this paper, it is expected
that this variable will have a negative influence on bankers' perception of
country creditworthiness.
The country's liquidity position determines its ability to respond to a
foreign exchange shortfall without running into debt service difficulties. In
this paper, RESTDSMP is used as an indicator of the country's level of
international liquidity and is expected to have apositive effect on bankers'
perception. It is postulated that bankers tend to feel more comtbrtable with
countries that have relatively strong international reserve positions. This
follows from the idea that a sizeable cushion of reserves allows a country
to ride out transitory difficulties in the balance of payments and to adjust
more smoothly to structural changes in the economy. In circumstances
where external shocks bring about a decline in the country's foreign
exchange earnings (such as decline in prices of export commodities), a
country with a high reserve ratio will have a greater chance of being able to
respond without running into debt-servicing difficulties. This is in contrast
to Gersovitz (1985), "willingness-to-pay" approach to foreign borrowing.
He argued that countries with a higher level of international reserves have
a greater probability ofrescheduling because of their capacity to withstand
diminished access to international credit following a rescheduling decision.
In this context, countries with high reserve ratios will be perceived as less
creditworthy and thus should be expected to pay higher risk premia.
In country risk literature, it is postulated that the longer the country has
to repay its debt, the lower the probability of rescheduling. Results from
Edwards (1984) showed that loan maturity negatively affects bank-loan and
bond-spread, which suggests that the longer the loan duration the lower the
risk premium because the country is perceived as more creditworthy. His
study, however, covered the period 1976 to 1980, which is before the
eruption of the debt crisis in 1982. It is possible that, with the onset of
massive reschedulings, the duration of the country's total loan commitments
negatively affects bankers' perception of country creditworthiness. Longer196 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
loan duration reflects a lesser urgency for developing countries to undertake
structural reforms necessary to attain sustainable growth, while shorter
repayment period or the more urgent the need for debt repayments reflects
a greater urgency to muster political will to implement sound but often
painful adjustment policies. The negative effect of a longer loan duration
may also be seen in the context of a "short lease" strategy believed to
characterize bank lending behavior. This is the strategy whereby banks keep
the maturities of their loan exposures short, with the belief that they can
minimize their losses in the event that a country will run into debt servicing
difficulties. This behavior is, of course, subject to the fallacy of composition
according to Guttentag and Herring (1985). In the event where a lender
wants to reduce its exposure because it has lost confidence in the debtor
country (which is the contingency the short-lease strategy is designed to
offset), it is quite possible that other lenders will also lack confidence.
Hence, with all the lenders on the run, it is very unlikely that the country
will care to liquidate assets so that some lenders can be repaid. Guttentag
and Herring (1985) argue that in reality this strategy is illogical, but in the
context of an individual bank, it is logical. This may account for the fact
that most long-term development loans are issued not by individual private
financial institutions but by a syndicate of lenders or by multinational
institutions such as the IMF-World Bank. Since no individual private bank
will take the risk of lending over a long period of time, the more likely
tendency is for all the banks to lend for only a short period. Given this
behavior, it may be expected that countries with a longer loan duration are
perceived as less creditworthy. Thus, AVGMTY or the average maturity of
a country's total external debt is expected to have a negative coefficient.
Bankers' perceptions are sensitive to indicators which reflect how
timely and effective the adjustment policies have been in addressing major
economic problems. This concerns primarily two typical goals of economic
adjustment, namely, price stability and international competitiveness.
In this paper, the ratio of exports to GDP (EXPGDP) will be used as an
indicator to reflect the country's openness to international competition. It
is postulated that bankers look favorably on economies that have pursuedMcMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTIONOF COUNTRY CREDITWORTHINESS 197
policies which strengthen its export sector and considers them as more
creditworthy. There has been co/lsiderable evidence that an outward-
oriented trade policy enhances the growth prospects of developing coun-
tries, as well as their capacity to adjust to external shocks. Little, Scitovsky,
and Scott (1970), the Bhagwhati-Krueger NBER study (1978) and Balassa
(1982) all reached the conclusion that outward orientation produce superior
results in the intermediate term. More recently, Balassa (1980) and Sachs
(1985) gave evidence in support of the conclusion that outward orientation
leads not only to better growth performance but also enhances a country's
ability to adjust to external shocks, including the debt crisis. Berg and Sachs
(1988) stressed that outward orientation refers to relative incentives given
to the production of exportables versus importables (with a zero bias or a
pro-export bias considered to be outward-oriented), and not to the extent to
which the trade regime is laissez-faire. As argued by many authors, e.g.,
Bradford (1987), Lin (1985), Sachs (1985), several of the most outward-
oriented economies, such as Korea and Taiwan, have highly dirigiste
governments, with highly regulated trade. The difference from the inward-
oriented policies elsewhere is that the dirigiste is directed toward export
promotion rather than import substitution.
Berg and Sachs (1988), utilizing the World Bank categorization of trade
policies of41 countries (1987) astheir basic measure of outward orientation,
have shown that outward orientation has anegative and significant influence
on the probability of rescheduling. De Grauwe and Rosiers (1987) argued
that the cost of transacting with other countries is lower in more open
economies (i.e., with a higher share of exports in GDP) than in more closed
economies. Savvides (1991) has shown that the country' s cost of engaging
in foreign transactions has a negative and significant influence on capital
inflows. Left (1975) has shown that a positive relationship exists between
the marginal product of capital and the rate of economic growth. Savvides
(1991) argued that, since the export sector is themost dynamic in developing
countries, the growth rate of exports therefore will provide an appropriate
proxy for the productivity of capital. Given this considerable body of
evidence, it is not surprising that most adjustment policies imposed by the198 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
World Bank or independently pursued by developing countries call for the
strengthening of the export sector and opening up of the economy to
international competition, as this type of policy is expected to create a more
efficient and productive economy.
A country with a high rate of inflation (INF) may be perceived as a
poorly-managed eeonomy with excessive and ineffective monetary and
fiscal policies, and hence, may be considered as less creditworthy. Expan-
sionary monetary and fiscal policies maytake the form of excessive growth
of the money supply, resulting :ina spiralling inflation which can conse-
quently lead to debt-servicing difficulties. Inflation, relative to that of the
country's major trading partners, is of course the most relevant. Given that
exchange rates do not necessarily fully compensate, an above average
inflation differential may hamper the international competitiveness of ex-
porters since it means higher labor costs for domestically purchased inter-
mediate goods. It usually therefore leads to a decline in export earnings. On
the other hand, it reduces the relative price of imports, causing import
demand to rise.
Other authors such as Sargen (1977) have emphasized the role of
monetary variables in rescheduling. His monetary approach model to debt-
rescheduling identifies the rate of growth of money supply and consumer
price index as important indicators of creditworthiness. Sargen employed
both the rate of growth of money supply and consumer prices in a discrimi-
nant analysis model and confirmed the importance of both as determinants
of the decision to reschedule. Using legit, Mayo and Barret (1978) found
that inflation exerts a positive and significant impact on the probability of
reseheduling. Finally, reporting results from their earlier logit/discriminant
analysis, Saini and Bates (1984) concluded that inflation and money supply
growth are two of the indicators with the greatest explanatory ability.
A country's inherent structural characteristics, reflected by slow chang-
ing variables such as the country's per capita income, investment or con-
sumption behavior and resource allocation, are also postulated to influence
bankers' creditworthiness assessment.McMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTION OF COUNTRY CREDITWORTHINESS 199
The ratio of investment to GDP (INVGDP), used as proxy to reflect
investment behavior, is expected to have a positive effect on bankers'
creditworthiness assessment. Higher investment rates may imply that a
country is directing the borrowed funds into more productive uses, which
should increase future income and consumption and reduce the likelihood
of rescheduling. This is supported empirically by other authors such as
Sachs (1981, 1982) and Kharas (1984).
Another important issue that will be investigated is the impact of the
country's resource allocation among the different productive sectors (i.e.,
the agricultural sector vis-a-vis other sectors). Are international bankers
biased against agricultural projects and towards industrial and commercial
loans? In domestic lending, particularly among LDCs, agricultural lending
always needs government support in the form of credit guarantees and/or
insurance, interest subsidy and in some countries, the government under-
takes a direct lending program themselves. This is because agricultural loans
have always been viewed as more risky. They usually involve projects with
long gestation periods which are vulnerable toforce majeure. At a macro-
economic level, for a basically agricultural economy, efficient reallocation
may be very limited because resources do not flow freely between the rural
agricultural sector and the modern industrial sector. This may also imply
that a greater share of its exports may come from tile agricultural sector,
which make the country more vulnerable because world agricultural prices
have greater variances than industrial prices. Given these considerations, it
isexpected that ifa large proportion of the country's income is derived from
the agricultural sector, bankers would view such a country as less credit-
worthy. Thus, the ratio of agriculture to GDP (AGRGDP) used to measure
a country's reallocation flexibility is expected to have a negative coefficient.
The final structural characteristic which is postulated to have a positive
effect on bankers' creditworthiness assessment is the country's per capita
income (GNPPC). Assuming declining marginal utility of consumption,
richer countries may offer less resistance to austerity measures than poorer
countries and thus may be more able to resolve potential disequilibrium.200 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Richer countries have greater flexibility in responding to slow economic
growth and a shortfall in •foreign exchange earnings. ..
Market potential (GDP) is held to be an important consideration in a
banks' creditworthiness assessment and consequently in its lending deci-
sions. In this study, the level of GDP is used as a proxy variable reflecting
market potential. Bankers will consider a country with a high level of GDP
as having a bigger market potential compared to a country with a low level
of GDP. A country with a greater level of output is expected to require
greater amount of external finance to sustain its growth and development.
Hence, bankers may view these countries as more creditworthy because
they •offer potential for further financial transactions.
Rescheduling always involves a significant reduction in a country's
access to the international credit market. Bankers shy away from resched-
uling countries Unless their lending exposure is so substantial that their
operations are threatened ifthey fail to roll-over the debtor country's debts.
The paper postulates that tile greater the number of reschedulings a debtor
country has tmdertaken, tile lower tile bankers' cred itworthiness assessment
of that country will be. The fact that international lending is characterized
by negative capital transfer to developing countries following their
reschedulings gives support to this argument. Bankers view repeated re-
scheduling as reflective ofthe country's inabilityto get out of the debt trap,
and hence, consider them as less creditworthy. Thus RSKX, used as proxy
for rescheduling experience is expected to have a negative coefficient.
It is widely believed that bankers have exhibited a growing tendency to
group and assess countries as blocs. Prior to 1982, this tendency was, to a
large extent, limited only to Africa (AFR) and the Middle East (ME) but as
the debt crisis deepened, this practice became pervasive even to the extent
that bankers assessed blocs of blocs (Institutional lnvestor 1982, p.190).
Repercussions from reschedulings and/or default of major debtors, as well
as political and social developments, are expected to lead to regional
contamination.
In the Latin American-Caribbean (LA)•region, Mexico's an-
nouncement of a debt moratorium in 1982 is alway s referred to as the startMcMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTION OF COUNTRY CREDITWORTHINESS 201
of the Latin American debt crisis which shattered any favorable perception
lenders had regarding the region, in July ofthatyear, Mexico agreed to pay
an 18.5 percent coupon, the highest ever in the Euromarket, for a $100
million bond issue (Institutional lnvestor 1982, p. 241). During the period
under study, political maladies also beset several countries in the region.
These include the revolving-door presidencies in Bolivia, Argentina's
Falklands war, guerilla insurgencies in Colombia, El Salvador and Peru and
the leadership of Manuel Noriega in Panama. All these reinforced lenders'
disenchantment with the region. Hence it is expected that the dummy
variable for this region will have a negative coefficient.
In the case of Europe-Mediterranean (EUR), tliere have been mixed
developments during the period under study. In the early 1980s, tl!e prob-
lems of "Eastern Europe" spilled over and affected Europe's regional
creditworthiness. Polish, Romanian and Yugoslav debts were major factors
in international financial balances, especially for U.K., West German and
French banks. A few years later, by the mid-1980s, there was a pendulum
swing following the over-reaction to the dark clouds that emanated from
Poland and Rumania. Compared to most developing countries, although the
Eastern bloc may be viewed to offer more acceptable risks andmay also be
normally buoyed by a favorable perception in Western Europe, bankers'
perception may still exhibit a negative bias against these countries due to
the continuing problem in the former Yugoslavia and the lackluster per-
formance of other forlner Eastern European economies.
The despondency over the political problems and generally depressed
situation of Africa led to its being consistently downgraded to the least
creditworthy region year after year. The continuing political shock waves
and social-cum-financial problems in Soutli Africa has placed the region in
a more fi'agile situation. Hence, countries from this region are expected to
be viewed negatively.
in the Asia-Pacific (ASIA) region, the political uncertainties that pre-
vailed inthe Philippines were insignificant compared to the generally stable
conditions in the rest of the region. During the period under study, nothing
untoward happened to dispel the bankers' growing conviction that Malaysia202 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
and Thailand arethefifth and sixth Asian tigers. Indonesia is also perceived
to have its house inorder. As a whole, all &the other countries inthe region
have been perceived as destined to share inEast Asia's growing prosperity.
The dummy variable for this region is expected to have a positive coeffi-
cient.
As for the Middle East region, in the early 1980s, the civil war in
Lebanon, fears about the military adventures &Libya andgenerally fragile
political conditions may have downgraded the region's perceived credit-
worthiness. But by the mid-1980s, the region's political situation seemed
to have settled in stalemate. Coupled with the favorable view that oil-
exporting countries normally get, bankers' perception may still register a
positive bias for this region.
Political, social and legal risks are also deemed important in bankers'
creditworthiness assessment. As pointed out by the Institutional Investor
survey, worries about"noneconomic" risks have become generalized. Prior
to 1982, these considerations surfaced only as limited responses to more or
less isolated political andmilitary events. Today, it is widely believed that
political instability or occurrence of forcible political change, either inter-
nally (such as political coups) or externally (such as military invasion) may
render governments unwilling and unable to pursue appropriate economic
policies, and in some cases, the present regime may be unwilling to honor
the debts incurred by previous governments. Social, legal and even envi-
ronmental factors can also be perceived as a hindrance to a country's
sustained development. But although they are closely aligned to the eco-
nomic prospects of the economy, they are typically nonquantifiable. In this
paper, the effects of these nonquantifiable country-specific factors will be
isolated by formulating a model that includes country dummies reflecting
its political, social and legal risks._IcMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTIONOF COUNTRY CREDITWORTHINESS 203
IV
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Two procedures were used to estimate Equation 1. The first is by
maximum likelihood estimation using a time-wise autoregressive model
which is of the form:
Yu = o_+ 13'Xuq+ ctt for all i= 1....74 and t= 1..5 (2)
gu= psit-I + p-_t. (2a)
E[p,it]= 0, Var[p-tt] = o'_2,Coy[p-u,P.J_]= 0 if t = s
The estimation involved three steps. First, a homocedastic, nonautocor-
related classical regression is estimated using ordinary least squares. Diag-
nostic test (i.e., Durbin-Watson statistic) reveals autocorrelation. Second, a
first-order autoeorrelation is suspected, so the residuals (git)saved from the
first estimation is regressed against e_t.!to obtain the value of p. Finally,
having obtained the value of p, which shows significant first order autocor-
relation, the model is solved using maximum likelihood estimator of Beach
and MacKinnon (1978). 2
The other is a panel data analysis specified on a least squares dummy
variable model (LSDV) and estimable by partitioned least squares. This is
a one-way fixed effects model of the form:
Yi_= _1dl + _xed2 +...+ 13'XJtq+ _ (3)
= c_t+ [5'Xtt./+ 8tt
E[_it] .w_. 0, Var[_;it] = _2 Cov[ett,_.sj] = 0
2. See Beach, C. and MacKinnon, J. (1978). The results obtained were more efficient and
robust.204 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
where
"Y" = measure of bankers' perceived country
creditworthiness (IICR);
"X" = vector of known explanatory variables discussed
in Section III,
"13" = vector of unknown parameters, and
"ct "= scalar which is assumed equal for all cross-sectional
units in the former model and specific to each individual
crossCsectional unit in the latter model.
For the latter approach, the analysis will focus on cross-sectional
heterogeneity. It is expected that variations in the scale of all variables may
not be fully captured by the explanatory variables, and these variations are
assumed to reflect the risks arising from the "nonquantifiable" political,
social and legal conditions in the debtor country. These country effects are
taken to be constant over time, but specific to each individual cross-sec-
tional unit (i.e., one-way fixed effects). The model is formulated in such a
manner that the differences across individual country units are captured by
the differences in the constant term, and can therefore be viewed as
parametric shifts of the regression.
The fixed effects specification is used to address the problems that may
arise from heteroscedasticity and data pooling. A classification efficiency
test is undertaken between this model specification with the least squares
pooled regression specification. The fixed effect specification is further
tested against the alternative specification of random effects using the
Hausman chi-squared statistic.
The empirical testing utilizes a panel data consisting of 74 developing
countries over a period of five years, 1984 to 1988, dictated mainly by the
availability of data. The data were primarily taken from World Development
Report, International Financial Statistics and World Debt Tables. In order
to take into account the time lags involved in data availability, a one-year
lag was chosen for the explanatory variables.McMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTION OFCOUNTRY CREDITWORTHINESS 205
v
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results of the first-order autoregressive model using maximum likeli-
hood estimation are listed in Table 1.Seven different regressions were run
to check the strength of the results.
Broadly speaking, the empirical evidence supports the contention that
banks take into account several economic indicators of country risk in their
creditworthiness assessment of the debt-servicing capacities of individual
countries. Both from the point of view of the overall fit of the model and
from the perspective of the signs and significance of the estimated coeffi-
cients, the results are satisfactory.
Totest the hypothesis that differences in perceived creditworthiness can
be due to regional effects, the sample countries were divided into five
geographical regions. In M 1, the effects of geographical location are iso-
lated by running regressions using only the regional dummies as explana-
tory variable in the pooled data. The regional dummy for North
Africa-Middle East (ME) was dropped to avoid the dummy variable trap
problem. Thus, the coefficients measure how each particular region differs
from ME in terms of cred itworthiness ratings.
The results generally support the contention that geographical location
has a direct bearing on bankers' perceived creditworthiness. The negative
sign of the estimated coefficients for the Latin America-Caribbean and
Africa-South of Sahara regions and Europe-Mediterranean imply that they
are generally perceived as less creditworthy than other regions. They had,
on average, a creditworthiness rating of 12.04, 12.26 and 7.01 points lower
than the countries in the Middle East region, respectively,
Political developments in Eastern Europe may largely explain bankers'
negative perception of the Europe-Mediterranean region as a whole. A
credit squeeze did occur in these countries. The net exposure of Western
banks in Eastern Europe declined from $46 billion in 1980 to $42 billion
by mid-1982 (Cline 1984: 17-18).Table 1
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD RESULTS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: IICR
Explanatory M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Vadables
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R-squared 0.38 0.58 0.82 . 0,41 0.11 0.67. 0,73
Adj. R-squared o.38 0,58 0.81 oAl 0.10 0.67 0,72
Akaike 5.51 5.13 3.39 5.00 5,94 4.96 4.28
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Amemiya 246.19 168.27 49. 55 148. _5 380l 2g 142.71 72.09 _0
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Log-likelihood -1538.63 -1366.69 -844.43 -995.10 -1467.45 -1321.78 -896,25 r- O





























F-test 56.44 79.07 78.27 59,18 19.66 231.31 66.05 "<
C)
Chi-squared 178,17 302,57 437,74 136,40 37.50 380.84 334.10 m
_o
Note: The figures in italics are t-statistics: *** skjniflcant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
-1- k
z
GDP = Gross Domestic Product GNPPC = GNP per capita m
TDGNP = ratio of total debt to GNP RSKX = cumulative rescheduling experience co
RESTDSMP = ratio oftotaf reserves (minus gold) INF = inflation rate
to debt-service payments and imports AGRGDP = share of agriculture to GDP
INVGDP = share of investments to GDP EXPGDP = share of exports to GDP _o O
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On the other hand, the Asia-Pacific region had a creditworthiness rating
that was 12.94 points higher than the countries in the North Africa-Middle
East region. Political uncertainties in the Philippines, and its subsequent
debt reschedulings in 1984, 1986 and 1987 were viewed as exceptions to
the moderate pattern of debt burden, and to stable political conditions in the
region compared to other regions.
Overall, the regional effect only explains 38 percent of the total vari:
ation in IICR. Although this may provide evidence for regional contamina-
tion, the differences in the bankers' perceived ereditworthiness of
developing countries cannot adequately be accounted for by perception of
risks arising specifically due to their geographical location. Other risk
factors are expected to be as important if not more important than regional
contamination risks.
In addition to the regional dummies, M2 includes GDP and reschedul-
ing history (RSKX). The positive and significant sign of GDP, used as a
proxy for market potential, supports the contention that large economies are
perceived favorably because of the bigger financial transaction that they can
potentially offer compared to smaller economies.
On the other hand, the negative coefficient ofrescheduling experience
(RSKX) also supports the contention that bankers shy away from countries
who have rescheduled in the past or who have the "reputation" of being
reschedulers. It appears that bankers perceived rescheduling countries as
having fallen into a "debt-trap" and hence will more likely face further
debt-servicing difficulties. Indeed, once a country has rescheduled, going
back to voluntary lending can be a difficult task.
These results may imply that bankers' perceptions are influenced by
their need for captive loan markets and by biases formed from the resched-
uling experience of the borrowing countries. The inclusion of these factors
(GDP and RSKX) improved the fit of the model which now explains 58
percent of the total variation in IICR. There was also a consistent drop in
the value of both the Akaike Information Criterion and the Amemiya
Prediction which confirms the increasing fitness of the model.McMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTION OF COUNTRYCREDrrWORTHINESS 211
M3 includes all risk factors reflecting the country's external debt
burden, medium-term adjustment and long-term structural characteristics.
The signs of the estimated coefficients for RSKX, GDP and all the regional
dummies did not exhibit any change.
The estimated coefficients of the three indicators of external debt
burden have the expected sign and are all significant atthe five percent level
except for TDGNP, which came out to be insignificant. One possible reason
for the insignificance of TDGNP, other than its significant correlation with
RSKX (which is 0.51), may be the fact that the sample countries include
poor developing economies. Some of them are barely able to borrow in the
international market, hence, a high TDGNP ratio may in fact reflect an
acceptable credit rating. Also, bankers may deliberately avoid downgrading
the credit risk of countries to which they have big loan exposures. This may
indicate that banks attempt to downplay the risk of overlending to specific
countries. This observation will be subjected to further test.
On the other hand, the strong result of AVGMTY reveals that bankers
view the maturity structure of the country's external debt quite differently
from the way it may actually influence a country's probability of resched-
uling. A longer loan duration may actually provide some flexibility _fora
debtor country to pursue growth without the heavy debt burden, and thus
prevent further rescheduling. In the model at hand, the negative coefficients
imply that countries with longer debt maturities are perceived as less
creditworthy and are believed to have a greater probability ofrescheduling.
This result gives support to the "short-leash" strategy of international
lending. As Citicorp advanced in its 1981 annual report, country risk from
foreign currency lending is reduced as the length of the obligation decreases,
since shorter maturities permit adjustments in exposure as balance of
payments or political conditions change. This finding also supports the
argument that, with the onset of debt reschedulings, the general perception
is that longer debt maturities imply less urgency for the country to muster
enough political will to undertake painful austerity measures necessary to
attain sustainable growth.212 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
It appears from the positive coefficient ofthe RESTDSMP that bankers
do not adhere to the "willingness-to-pay" approach of analyzing debt
rescheduling. This approach argues that countries with a high level of
reserves have greater incentives to reschedule or even to simply default
because they have the ability to sustain their economies even with the
limited access to international credit that will ensue following their resched-
uling or default.
The estimated coefficient of medium-term adjustment variables shows
that bankers give importance to price stability, INF having the expected sign
and being significant at the five percent level. But invigorated exports are
not enough to convince bankers of a country's creditworthiness, EXPGDP
having exhibited a wrong sign and being insignificant..
Except for AGRGDP, the significant coefficients of the variables
chosen to reflect the country's long-term structural characteristics support
the contention that banks gave important consideration to a country's
savings and investment behavior (INVGDP) and level of per capita income
(GNPPC). Countries with higher levels of per capita income have signifi-
cantly better ratings than those having low income. The positive coefficient
oflNVGDP implies that a country with high investment is also likely to be
rated high. Assuming that bank lending _behavior has a direct bearing on
their assessments of country risk, governments seeking external financing,
or rescheduling countries attempting to go back to voluntary lending, should
attempt to improve their savings and investment behavior.
The inclusion of economic risk factors has greatly improved the mode!.
All the regional dummies have retained their signs and significance at least
at the five percent level. Except for TDGNP, EXPGDP and AGRGDP, all
the estimated coefficients are significant, at leastat the five percent level.
The model explains 81 percent of the total variation in IICR. The substan-
tially increased fit of the model is confirmed by the significant declines in
the AIC and the Amemiya Prediction statistics, as well as by the increasing
values of the log-likelihood functions for normal disturbances and for the
model with no regressors. The F and X2statistics also allow a rejection of
the null hypothesis that the regressors are jointly insignificant.McMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTIONOF COUNTRYCREDITWORTHINESS 213
To isolate the impact of each component of economic risks, M4, M5
and M6 were tested. M4 explains 41 percent of the total variation in IICR,
which confirms the importance of the country's debt burden in banks'
creditworthiness assessment. The result dispels any doubt that higher
TDGNP ratios negatively affect bankers assessment. Even with the exclu-
sion of all other variables, except for INF, the estimated coefficient for
EXPGDP remains insignificant, although it exhibits the correct sign as
shown in M5. The medium-term adjustment variables can only explain 10
percent of the total variation in IICR. M6, which includes only the structural
variables, explains almost 67 percent of the variation in IICR. M7, which
excludes the regional dummies but includes GDP and RSKX, explains
almost 72 percent of the total variation in IICR. Hence, one may conclude
that, although banks' creditworthiness assessments are influenced by sub-
jective biases, they have an objective basis.
Part of the unexplained variance is undoubtedly caused by political
factors which are not explicitly included in the model. Nonetheless, the
regional dummies should have partially captured these. Moreover, one can
expect a positive correlation between economic and political risks. It is
highly probable that poor economic performance goes hand in hand with
political turmoil. Thus, economic variables should also provide partial
coverage of the political, legal and social climates. This issue will be
considered further in the succeeding model specification, in which country
dummy variables are included to isolate differences not captured by the
explanatory variables.
M4 to M7 were re-estimated using a one-way fixed effects specification
and the results are shown in Table 2.
M4a shows TDGNP as the only significant debt burden variable at five
percent. The estimated coefficients of RESTDMP and AVGMTY are all
insignificant. The estimated coefficients of the medium-term adjustment
variables, INF and EXPGDP, are likewise insignificant. Estimated coeffi-
cients of GDP reflecting the market opportunities and rescheduling history,
RSKX, are also insignificant. Presumably, their differences also reflect the
soeio-political risks of the country represented by the dummy variables.214 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table2
ONE-WAYFIXED EFFECTS PANELDATh RESULTS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:IICR





















Estimated Autocorrelation 0.24 0.36 0,30 0.24
Log-likelihood:
(1) Constanttermonly -1063.30 -1486.20 -1512.20 -1063.30
(2) GroupEffectsonly -583.58 -842.72 -835,75 -583.58
(3) X-variablesonly -995.10 -1467.45 -1321,78 -896.25
(4) X andgroupeffects -580.00 -824.25 -798.62 -559.40
R-squared:
(1) Constanttermonly 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00McMIKEN: BANKERS' PERCEPTION OFCOUNTRY CREDIIWORTHINESS 215
Table2 continued
Explanatoryvariables M4a MSa M6a M7a
(2) GroupEffectsonly 0.98 0.98 0.98 0,98
(3) X-variablesonly 0.41 0.11 0,67 0.73
(4) X and groupeffects 0,98 0.98 0,98 0.98
Adjusted R-squared 0,97 0.98 0.98 0.97
Testsformodelrestrictions
Likelihood Ratio Tests:X2
(2) vs (1) 959.44 1322.97 1352.89 959.44
(3) vs (1) 136.40 37,50 380.84 334.10
(4) vs (1) 966.60 1323,90 1427.16 1007.81
(4) vs (2) 7.16 0.93 74.28 48.38
(4) vs (3) 830.20 1286,40 1046,32 673.72
F-tests:
(2) vs (1) 171.59 206.65 213,00 171.59
(3) vs (1) 59.18 19.66 231.00 66.05
(4) vs (1) 164.15" 199.64 251.79 165.06
(4) vs (2) 1,91 0.37 21.89 4.05
(4) vs (3) 100.25 183.48 83.12 50.60
Randomvs.Fixed-Hausman 45.78 11,53 35.10 70.84
•Note: thefiguresinitalicsaret-statistics:*** significant at 1%;** significant at 5%;
* significantat 10%.
GDP = GrossDomesticProduct





INVGDP = shareof investments toGDP
AGRGDP = shareof agriculture toGDP
GNPPC = GNP percapita
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What is interesting are the results for the long-term structural variables.
The estimated coefficients for AGRGDP, both in M6a and M7a, exhibit the
correct sign and are highly significant. INVGDP remain highly significant
while GNPPC became insignificant in M9a. This latter result may imply
that differences in GNPPC are merely country differences which can be
captured by the dummy variables.
The overall result for the long-term.structural factors, however, suggest
that the country's socio-political conditions, as proxied by country dum-
mies, cannot capture nor predominate the effect era country's efficiency in
resource allocation or investment and savings behavior on bankers' percep-
tion. But it appearsthat the country's short-term liquidity and medium-term
characteristics may form the basis of bankers' fixed perceptions of its
socio-p01itical condition.
The results of the panel data analysis reveal that the only economic risk
factors which remain highly significant are the long-term structural factors,
INVGDP and AGRGDP, and the country's level of debt burden: This may
imply that bankers' perception era country's general socio-political condi-
tions go hand-in-hand with their perception of the country's short-to-me-
dium economic risk situation. The only "objective" economic variables that
could alter bankers' pereepti0ns are those that reflect the country's long-
term prospects, i.e., its efficiency in resource allocation and savings and
investment behavior and level of debt burden.
In testing the significance of the estimated coefficients of the country
dummies, the usual t-ratio implies a test of the null hypothesis that each o_
is zero. The standard errors would show that they are all highly significant.
But a more useful test in a regression context is to test the null hypothesis
that the constant terms are all equal. Using both the F and the %_- tests, testing
of the model restrictions rejects the null hypothesis of equal constant terms
at the one percent level.
In assessing the goodness of fit of the regressions, the results listed in
Table 1 include the log-likelihood, the sum of squares and the R2statistics.
Increases in the log-likelihoods were achieved in all the models (M4a to
M7a), when both the group effects (i.e., country dummies) and the exp!ana-McMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTION OF COUNTRY CREDITWORTHINESS 217
tory variables were included, compared to specifications which onlyinclude
either one of them, which implies the superior fit of the one-way fixed
effects specification. These results are eonfirmed by the falling sum of
squares and the rising R2s. The Re statistics show that constant terms alone
do not have explanatory power, while the group effects alone explain 98
percent of the total variation in IICR in all of the models tested. M4a shows
that the external debt variables explain 41 percent of the total variation in
IICR, while the medium-term adjustment variables in M5acan only explain
11 percent. The long-term structural variables show strong explanatory
power accounting for over 67 percent of the total variation in IICR.
Inclusion of RSKX and GDP in M7a increased the explanatory power of
theX-variables only models to 73 percent. The specification, which includes
both the X-variables and the country dummies, have the strongest explana-
tory power in all the models tested, explaining almost 98 percent of the total
variations in IICR. The adjusted R2statistics for model specification, which
includes the x-variables and the country dummies, show a slight loss of fit.
From the above results, one may conclude that perceived "nonquanti-
fiable" political, social and legal risks can also fully capture the economic
risks, but not vice-versa. In all the models estimated, the explanatory power
of the group effects only specification is 98 percent, while the highest
explanatory power that an X-variables only specification can achieve is 73
percent.
The F and )C 2 statistics of all the regression equations tested reject the
null hypothesis that there are no group effects and that the _'s have no
explanatory power at the one percent level. Both the F and 2 likewise reject
the null hypothesis that both the country dummies and the )C'shave no
explanatory power in all the regression equations tested. Except for M5a
which has insignificant explanatory variables, both the F and )C 2 reject the
null hypothesis that there are group effects, but the regressors have no
explanatory power at the one percent level. Both the F-tests and ;_2also
reject the null hypothesis at the one percent level that the regressors have
explanatory power but that the country dummies are insignificant. As a218 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
whole, the diagnostic test confirms that the best model specification is the
one that includes both the regressors and the group effects. It can be
concluded therefore that the markets' perceived rescheduling probabilities
can be explained by economic risk factors, but more importantly by "non-
quantifiable" political, social and legal risk factors.
Finally, in alltheregressions tested, the Hausman Z2 statistic rejectsthe
null hypothesis that the cross-sectional differences can be captured by
randomdisturbances orthatthe GLS estimator of aone-way randomeffects
model specification is theappropriatealternative totheleast squares dummy
variable (LSDV) estimator. The one-way fixed effects appear to be the
better model specification.
Table 3 shows the estimated fixed effect coefficients for M7a. The
political situationsin E1Salvador andNicaragua appear to have contributed
mainly totheir large negative deviation from the mean fixed effect. Of the
ten countries which exhibited high•political, social and legal risks, seven
came fromtheLatinAmerica region while the remaining three were African
countries. On the other hand, favorable conditions in China, Malaysia,
SouthKorea, India,Thailand andIndonesia during theperiod covered have
increased its perceived creditworthiness. The top seven viewed to have
•acceptable socio-political risks are countries from the Asia-Pacific region.
Vl
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the autoregressive pooled data analysis pinpoints the degree
of influence and significance of a large number of "objective" economic
risk factors. Bankers' creditworthiness assessments are found to be sensitive
not only to a country's debt burden but also to its pertbrmance in terms of
maintaining stable prices. Long-term structural characteristics reflecting
resource allocation, savings and investment behavior and per capita income
are also found to have significant impact on bankers' perception. Nonethe-
less, the strong impact of rescheduling experience, regional contamination
and desire for market opportunities indicate that bankers' creditworthinessMcMIKEN: BANKERS' PERCEPTION OFCOUNTRY CREDITWORTHINESS 219
Table 3
MODEL 7AESTIMATED ONE-WAYFIXED EFFECTS
Country Dummies Fixed Effect Coefficient Deviationfrom the
cq's Mean
1 El Salvador 10.33 -20.63
2 Nicaragua 11.26 -19.70
3 Zambia 14.80 -16.16
4 Jamaica 15.32 -15.64
5 DominicanRepublic 16.13 -14.83
6 Haiti 16.55 -14.41
7 Bolivia 16.86 -14.10
8 Honduras 17.07 -13.89
9 Sudan 17.21 -13.75
10 Zaire 18.52 -12.44
11 Peru 18.60 -12.36
12 CostaRica 18.65 -12.31
13 SierraLeone 18.82 -12.14
14 Liberia 20,79 -10.17
15 Ethiopia 21.70 -9.26
16 Senegal 23.02 -7.94
17 Mauritius 23.13 -7.83
18 Argentina 24.91 -6.05
19 Tanzania 25.18 -5.78
20 Ecuador 26.05 -4.91
21 Morocco 26.78 .4.18
22 Chile 26.86 .4,10
23 Yugoslavia 27.11 -3.85
24 Philippines 27.17 -3.79
25 Uruguay 29.10 -1,86
26 Sri Lanka 29.66 -1.30220 " JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 3 continued
CountryDummies Fixed Effect Coefficient Deviation from the
cq's Mean
27 Panama 29.97 -0.99
28 Gabon 31.12 0.16
29 Brazil 31.57 0.61
30 Mexico 32.38 1.42
31 Pakistan 32.43 1.47
32 Nigeria 32.89 1.93
33 Egypt 32.95 1.99
34 Venezuela 33.10 2.14
35 Jordan 33.39 2.43
36 Kenya 35.39 4.43
37 Paraguay 36.04 5.08
38 Turkey 37,55 6.59
39 IvoryCoast 38.03 7.07
40 Cameroon 39.02 8.06
41 Oman 39.70 8.74
42 Tunisia 39.85 8.89
43 Colombia 43.66 12.70
44 Algeria 44.39 13.43
45 Papua NewGuinea 45.58 14.62
46 indonesia 51.17 20.21
47 Thailand 54.68 23.72
48 india 54.73 23.77
49 Korea,South 55.33 24.37
50 Malaysia 61.79 30.83
51 China 70.46 39.50
Mean fixed effect 30.96McMIKEN:BANKERS'PERCEPTION OF COUNTRYCREDITWORTHINESS 221
assessment are not without subjective biases. Interestingly, the overall
significance of country dummies in the one-way fixed effects panel data
analysis, provides evidence that bankers' creditworthiness assessments are
greatly sensitive to perceived risks arising from a country's socio-political
conditions which are proxied by country dummies. These "nonquantifi-
able" risk factors also appear to predominate risks arising from a country's
liquidity and solvency conditions, as well as economic performance in the
medium term. The results indicate ttiat the only "objective" economic risk
factors that could alter bankers' perceptions are those that reflects an
economy's long-term prospects, i.e., resource allocation and savings and
investment behavior and debt burden. Given the negative and significant
impact of cumulative rescheduling experience and the fixity of bankers'
perceptions, developing countries may have to rely on other forms of
financing to fund their development objectives.222" JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
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INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR COUNTRY RISK RATINGS, 1979-1992 _=
COUNTRIES 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 AVE..
LATINAMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN 47.6 43.2 40.2 35.1 28.5 23.8 22.8 22.8 22.5 21.9 21.1 21.5 22.8 23.9 28.4
1 Argentina 62.4 63.5 59,9 43.6 29.2 24,1 21.5 23,8 25.0 24.0 20.7 18,5 19,9 24,9 32.9
2 Barbados 30.7 32.0 32,6 34.1 34.0 36.7 38,4 38,2 36.9 34,8
3 Bolivia 31.6 26.5 20.5 15,7 11.2 8.7 7,9 7.7 7,9 9.3 9.4 11,7 14.6 17.1 14,2
4 Brazil 64.9 55,4 49.3 51.3 42,9 29,9 31.3 33.6 33,6 28,9 28,5 26.9 27,0 27.1 37,9
5 Chile 54.2 53.9 54,6 50.8 38,4 26,9 24.2 24,9 26.2 28.1 32,4 37.0 40.3 45.0 38,3
6 Colombia 60.7 59.1 58.4 55.7 53.2 47.0 39.8 38.8 39.5 38.5 37.0 32.8 36.0 37.8 45.3
c




8 DominicanRepublic 36.4 31.5 27.7 21,9 16.1 t4.3 13.3 14.2 15.2 14.8 16.2 17.3 17.0 17.2 19.5
9 Ecuador 53.2 52.3 51.4 45.0 31.5 25.2 24.6 26.6 25.2 22.3 18.9 17.5 19.3 20.1 30.9 O
10 El Salvador 15.8 13.0 7.2 6.5 6.4 6.4 7.0 8.1 8.8 9.9 10.3 10.9 11.8 9.4 _
F
11 Guatemala 2t.6 16.6 13.4 12.1 12.7 12.9 12.9 14.2 14.7 15.7 16.9 17,2 15.1 -_
"o
12 Haiti 9.3 8.7 9.4 9.9 8.0 7.2 8.1 8.2 6.9 8A
m
13 Honduras 19.1 15.9 11.5 10.1 9.8 12.1 12.4 13.7 14.0 13.5 14.0 13.9 13.3 o
.m
14 Jamaica 24.0 18.2 16.1 17,3 16.3 14.7 14.7 14.9 15.0 16.0 17:6 19.0 19.8 19.9 17.4 < m
15 Mexico 71.8 72.4 70.2 58.8 35;5 37.2 39.2 33.6 27.9 28.5 29.8 33.8 38.3 41.8 44.2
"o
16 Nicaragua 10.4 9.9 10.1 7.1 5.7 5,0 4.9 5.3 5.2 5.4 4.6 5.3 7.1 7.6 6.7 m
.z
-IAppendix I continued __
COUNTRIES 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 199t 1.992 AVE.
z
17Panama 48.5 46.1 42.2 40.6 37.5 33.7 31.9 31.0 30.3 26.7 19.4 17.5 17.5 18.4 31.5 z
18Paraguay 43.4 45.1 45.8 43.2 39,1 34.4 32.7 31.4 30.2 27.3 25.6 26.2 26.5 26.6 34.1
19 Peru 30.7 17.6 43.4 39.3 31.7 24.0 19.6 15.4 14.3 13_5 10.9 10.7 12.3 13.8 21.2
"o
20 Trinidad andTobago 58.3 58.4 56.5 54.1 53.1 49.9 46.8 43.9 40.2 37.4 31.6 30.6 29.7 28.2 44,2 m
21 Uruguay 41.0 41.6 41.2 39.8 34.7 28.7 27.9 27.7 27.7 28.4 28.9 30.0 30.6 32.0 32.9 _)
m
22Venezuela 72.4 70.3 67.7 61.8 50.4 37.6 37.1 38.9 36.5 35.9 33.5 32.0 35.8 39.0 46.3
z
NORTH AFRICA O '11




23Algeria 58.6 58.5 58.0 55.2 54.9 54.0 53.7 51.9 44.9 40.9 39.7 38.9 36.1 31.0 48.1
-<
24 Egypt 33.9 34.1 37.4 35.3 34.0 32.5 34.8 31.1 24.6 23.4 24.1 22.7 22.9 25.9 29.7 C_
;o
251ran 36.2 16.1 13,5 12.1 14.7 18.6 18.7 18.7 18.9 18.7 21.2 23.8 27.5 32.2 20.8 rn
261raq 60.4 57.2 45.0 38.7 27.7 19.7 19.4 18.7 16.0 14.8 16.3 18.2 11.7 8.6 26.6 ._
27Jordan 44.7 42.5 40.8 38,1 37.3 36.6 37.1 38.2 36.5 35.3 32.4 27.3 20.9 21.0 34.9
;0
28Kuwait 79.3 72.6 70.8 69.4 66.4 64.6 64.1 63.2 58.6 58.8 59.3 60.8 40.4 47.1 62.5 --I
29Morocco 45.5 40.2 38.3 32.5 29,9 24.9 23.1 23.1 22.9 24.0 26.1 27.8 27.8 29.6 29.7 _[ rn
30Oman 52.0 47.1 46.9 46.2 47.2 49.6 51.9 53.I 50.4 50.5 52.0 52.4 48.7 49.3 49.8
31Saudi Arabia 85.4 77.0 74.0 73.1 72.5 71.7 69.7 66.6 35.6 60.4 60.6 60.1 55.5 57.1 65.6
32Syria 39.3 36.0 30.0 23.1 20.0 17.5 18.4 19.8 17.8 18.6 18.1 18.4 19.4 20.1 22.6
33Tunisia 50.0 49.0 48.0 46.4 46.6 45.0 42.6 40.5 35.4 33.4 36.1 37.9 38.4 37,8 41.9 ro
PoAppendix 1continued _) o_
COUNTRIES 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 AVE.
ASIAAND THE PACIFIC 64.8 61.8 61.4 57.8 56.0 54.5 54.6 54.5 53.6 53.4 54.0 53.9 53.1 52.9 56.2
34Australia 87,7 88.9 90.2 89.6 86.i 84.1 83.0 79.7 74.6 70.0 70.1 70.4 67.6 66.8 79.2
35China 71.1 73.0 69.3 63.1 62.0 64.6 67.7 68.2 65.7 64.1 61.7 52.7 52.3 54.7 63.6
36 Hongkong 77.3 77.8 76.8 75.2 71.8 65.0 66.6 69.3 68.9 69.1 69.6 65.6 64.1 65.2 70.1
37 India 54.2 51.1 49.2 46.6 46.3 47,3 46,1 50.t 50_2 49.2 47.9 47.1 41.4 37.6 47.4
38 Indonesia 53,2 54.8 57.3 56.2 52.8 49.7 49.5 48.6 44,7 43.1 44,6 47.9 50.4 50.6 50.2
39 Korea, South 71.2 61.0 56.3 57,1 56,4 55.7 57.6 57.7 60.3 63.1 67.1 69.2 68.4 68.0 62.1
40 Malaysia 70.3 72.5 73.3 72,3 70.0 67.3 65.1 6t .8 55.8 55.0 56.6 59.8 61.7 62.8 64.6
41 New Zealand 78.2 77.5 77.7 75.0 71.9 70.9 70,3 68.7 66.3 64.6 64.1 64.1 62.8 62.0 69.6
(=
42 Pakistan 26.3 20.9 21.7 21.6 20.9 22,5 27.0 28.9 30.2 31.t 30.8 30.4 28.92 7.9 26.3 ;0
43 Papua New Guinea 42,8 46,0 43.2 41.6 39.9 40.4 39.4 38,6 37.6 37.8 35.8 33.5 31.6 39.1
44Philippines 53.7 47.6 42.9 39.5 34.2 23.3 19.5 20.1 22.7 23.9 24.9 25.8 25.9 25.5 30,7 O
45 Singapore 78.9 78.1 78.5 78.5 77.8 78.8 78.7 75.6 74.3 75.1 76.3 77.8 78.5 78.4 77.5 ._
46SdLanka 30.4 29.9 27.0 24.9 24,8 24.3 22,9 22.5 22.3 22.0 23.8 25.0 r_
"0
47Taiwan 65.8 66.8 68.9 68.0 67.3 69.0 71.2 73.3 74.7 76.6 77.9 77.7 77.1 77.2 72.2 -_












&THE MEDITERRANEAN 49.9 47.4 45.7 40.4 37.3 36.7 39.2 40.9 41.5 42.0 42.7 43.3 41.9 41.4 42.2 m
:;o
49Cyprus 39.4 36.7 36,3 34.3 34,9 33.0 36.5 38.8 40.3 42.7 45.5 46.2 45.2 46.8 39.7 -o m
50 Greece 54.9 51.8 51.4 48.2 46.3 46.9 48,8 48.4 47.4 47.2 52,5 62.6 61.8 62.2 58,1
51 Hungary 62.6 58.9 56.1 50.5 44,8 45.0 48.9 5t.5 48.8 45.2 44.5 43.6 41.1 42.0 48.8 "_.
52 Israel 53.7 45.6 39.8 34.7 32.1 29.2 28.6 29.9 33.1 34.6 34.8 36.4 35.1 36.1 36.0
z
53Portugal 52.0 54.8 56,8 55.2 50.8 47.9 49,6 51.2 54.3 57.0 60.5 63.1 63.4 65.0 55.8 O
-n
54 Romania 54.8 52.3 48.2 25.2 16.7 19.8 26.7 31.6 31,3 32.9 32,6 32.4 26.3 25.2 32.5 o
O
55 Spain 70.3 70,4 69.3 65.5 62.4 63.2 66.0 69.7 71.9 73.5 75.4 76.8 75.8 76.0 70.4 (:: z
56Turkey 14.8 12.1 14.9 18.8 23.9 29.0 34.6 38.0 39.9 40,8 41.1 41.4 42.8 43.8 31.1 _o
-<








58Cameroon 34,0 36.6 35,7 36.5 38.1 37.3 34.8 31.8 27.7 23.7 21.8 32.5 -_
m
59 Ethiopia 13.8 12.3 10,8 9.5 9.2 8.8 8.0 9.7 9.1 8.3 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.0 9.2 co
co
60 Gabon 33.3 34,7 35.8 35.2 36.2 35.5 38.2 40.3 36.2 33.5 30.9 28.8 26,6 26.4 33.7
61 IvoryCoast 48.2 47.0 42.9 39.0 35.9 31,0 26.5 27.1 27,0 25.7 23.4 20,1 9.4 16.6 30,0
62Kenya 45.6 44.2 40.0 33.9 29.0 26,7 27.9 29,7 30.0 30.5 30.0 30.7 29.0 25.1 32.3
¢,o
PoAppendix 1 conb'nued _o
COUNTRIES 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 AVE.
63 Liberia 40.7 32.6 19.0 12.2 11.2 10,7 11.7 11.1 10,5 10.4 9.9 8.7 8.5 6.6 14.5
64 Matawi 23.4 19.6 I7.0 15,2 16.0 18.2 16.7 15.4 15.6 15.4 16.3 16.1 17.1
65Mauritius - 21.0 19.7 18.1 18.2 21.7 24.5 25.3 2814 31.1 34.2 33.9 34.5 25.9
66 Nigeria 54.1 54.1 55.6 50.2 39.4 31.2 26.3 23.4 21.4 19.8 18.3 17.9 19.4 20.4 32.2
67 SenegaL 28.5 28.7 24_3 19.7 16.7 16.2 16.9 18.4 18.5 19.4 19.2 19.4 18.0 17.8 20.1
68Sierra Leone 22.6 17.6 13.9 11.0 9.1 7.7 7.0 7.1 6.3 7.6 8.2 7,3 7.2 6,3 9.9
69 SouthAfrica 62.0 58.5 61.8 60.5 57.5 57.2 54.5 42.1 32.1 32.4 32.3 34.9 36.7 39.6 47.3
70Sudan 18.5 13.7 11.3 9,8 8.2 7.2 7.6 7.3 6.2 5.5 5.I 5.4 6.4 5,58,4
7i Tanzania 25.0 20.0 15.2 11.3 9.8 8.3 9.3 10.6 10.2 9.9 9.4 10,4 11.4 12.2 12.3 ¢._
72 Uganda 8.7 8.2 5.7 5.1 4.0 4.4 5.7 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.0 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.6 c °
;;o
73Zaire 9.8 7.7 6.7 6.2 5.6 5.8 7.5 9.4 9.9 10.4 9.2 9.2 9.9 9.2 8.3 z
>




SAMPLEAVERAGE 49.0 45.7 42.9 39.0 35.7 33.1 33.2 33.3 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.1 31.5 31.9 36.0 F
GLOBAl,AVERAGE 55.4 51.9 48.7 44.4 41.2 39.8 40.3 40.5 39.5 38.8 38.9 39.0 37.6 36.1 42.3
I"11
o
rn
<
rn
r-
O
"0
=:
m
z
-I